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This paper applies the techniques of mechanism design to ﬁnd an optimal nonlinear
pension beneﬁtr u l ef o rﬂexible old-age retirement. We assume that individuals
have private information regarding their expected lifespans. The government’s
goal is to design a pension system (a payroll tax and a function relating beneﬁts
to employment length), which maximizes a social welfare function and satisﬁes a
social budget constraint. Since individuals with diﬀerent expected lifespans opti-
mize their employment lengths conditional on the beneﬁt function, the government
must also take into account incentive constraints.
We characterize the solution to this problem for various social welfare func-
tions. Under utilitarianism, the solution is a completely inﬂexible system, where
all individuals retire at the same age with the same (yearly) beneﬁts; and, sur-
prisingly, the ﬁrst-best (complete information) aggregate welfare is attained. If
the social welfare function is strictly concave, then individuals with shorter ex-
pected lifespans retire earlier with beneﬁts lower than those in the ﬁrst-best. In
the optimal pension system, individuals with shorter expected lifespans subsidize
those who expect to live longer. We also compute the optimal beneﬁtr u l ef o r
several speciﬁcations with CRRA utility functions and realistic parameter values,
and discuss the numerical results.
Keywords: ﬂexible retirement, asymmetric information, actuarial fairness, mech-
anism design
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21 Introduction
Increasing life expectancy notwithstanding, people retire earlier nowadays than
they did decades ago. For example, Coile and Gruber (2000) report that 81% of
the 62 year old US male cohort worked in 1950, and this ratio dropped to 51%
by 1995.1 A common explanation for this phenomenon is that pension beneﬁt
rules are poorly designed in many countries (Stock and Wise, 1990; Samwick,
1999; Gruber and Wise, eds., 1999), which, among other things, endangers the
sustainability of social security systems. It is therefore an important social task
to improve pension beneﬁt rules so that social security systems remain feasible
(by, for example, increasing retirement age), while other goals, such as insurance,
fairness, and the accommodation of heterogeneous individual characteristics, are
also attained.
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing optimal ﬂexible pension
beneﬁt rules under the assumption that individuals have private information re-
garding their expected lifespans. The government’s goal is to design a pension
system (a payroll tax or contribution and a function relating beneﬁts to employ-
ment length), which maximizes a social welfare function and satisﬁes a social bud-
get constraint. Since individuals with diﬀerent expected lifespans optimize their
employment lengths conditional on the beneﬁt function, the government must
also take into account incentive constraints. We will use techniques familiar from
optimal mechanism design, in particular, optimal income taxation pioneered by
Mirrlees (1971), to ﬁnd the optimal solution to the government’s problem.
Some of our (preliminary and incomplete) ﬁndings conﬁrm the intuition of clas-
sic mechanism design models (e.g., we ﬁnd “no distortion at the top”), but we also
obtain surprising results. For example, if the social welfare function is utilitar-
ian, then the solution to the government’s second-best problem is a completely
inﬂexible system, which makes every individual retire at the same age with the
same yearly beneﬁts, but attains the ﬁrst-best (complete information) aggregate
welfare. If the social welfare function is strictly concave, then individuals with
shorter expected lifespans retire earlier with beneﬁts that are lower than those in
the ﬁrst-best.
In the pension literature, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) were the ﬁrst to study
mechanism design problems, namely, concerning disability beneﬁts. However, the
bulk of the literature has conﬁned attention to models where heterogeneity is
present in individual preferences (the disutility of labor), and overlooked other
important aspects, like the heterogeneity and asymmetric information regarding
individual lifespans. One recent and notable exception is the book of Diamond
(2001), where several models are analyzed, including one with heterogeneity in
individual lifespans. Independently of his work, one of the authors also proposed
1In the US, the normal retirement age is 65, while the minimum retirement age is 62.
3a model (Simonovits, 2001) where individuals know their own expected lifespans
and elasticities for leisure and the government only knows their distribution. That
paper proposed the dampening of incentives in the traditional fair beneﬁtr u l ea n d
alluded to the possibility of solving the problem by optimal mechanism design, a
task that we carry out in the present paper. We explain how our approach and
results diﬀer from those of the literature below.
Under the assumptions (usual in the literature, but diﬀerent from those of the
present paper) that the government and the individuals have the same information
regarding expected lifespans, and that asymmetric information pertains to the
individuals’ disutilities of labor, the optimal beneﬁtr u l ei st h eactuarially fair
schedule, bF(R)=τR/(m − R) where R is retirement age, τ is the social security
payroll tax, m is the expected lifespan of all individuals, and bF(R) is the yearly
beneﬁt of a pensioner retiring at age R. Under this beneﬁt rule, workers who
prefer leisure more retire earlier and receive yearly beneﬁts corresponding to their
lifetime contributions and to their remaining lifespan.2
If there is indeed no asymmetric information regarding expected lifespans, then
the actuarially fair schedule is optimal (Börsch-Supan, 2001). However, if some
individuals know that their expected lifetime is longer than the average, then they
can retire later (closer to m) and enjoy disproportionately high beneﬁts for the rest
of their lives. Therefore the actuarially fair beneﬁts c h e d u l em a yn o tb es u s t a i n a b l e
when individuals have private information regarding their expected lifespans.
The logic of traditional fairness is undermined by the strong positive rela-
tionship between the individual lifespan and the individual length of employment
(those living longer also work longer). This positive correlation is established
empirically by Waldron (2001), and modelled by Gruber and Orszag (1999), Si-
monovits (1999), and Guegano (2000). An indirect (and disputed) argument for
the possibility of individuals anticipating their lifespans is provided by the well-
k n o w nf a c tt h a tt h ea g e - s p e c i ﬁc mortality rates of people buying private annuities
are signiﬁcantly lower that those of the general population (Friedmann and War-
shawski, 1990).
In chapters 6 and 7 of Diamond (2001), a model where individuals have private
information regarding their lifespan is considered and the optimal beneﬁtr u l ei s
derived where individuals are allowed to retire at two diﬀerent pre-speciﬁed ages.
Our approach is similar to this except that we allow for a continuum of retirement
ages. On the other hand, we simplify the setup by assuming that all individuals
have the same disutility of labor. In a related paper, Simonovits (2002) considers
a case where both individual lifespans and labor disutilities are heterogeneous but
restricts the analysis to the special case of linear beneﬁt functions.
Our main contribution to the existing literature on pension system reforms is to
2With no discounting, an individual’s contributions equal the beneﬁts s/he receives, τR =
bF(R)(m − R).
4extend the analysis of optimal pension beneﬁt rules in an important new direction,
by assuming that individuals have private information regarding their expected
lifespans. We analytically derive the equations that determine the optimal second-
best beneﬁtr u l e . T h i sb e n e ﬁt rule appears to be very much diﬀerent from the
actuarially fair schedule (which would be optimal if individuals diﬀered in their
disutilities of labor, but not in their expected lifespans). The socially optimal and
incentive compatible beneﬁt rule leads to a redistribution from individuals with
shorter expected lifespans to individuals with longer expected lifespans.3 The
properties of the optimal beneﬁt rule depend on the shape of the social welfare
function: more egalitarian social objectives lead to more ﬂexible beneﬁt rules.
We also compute the optimal beneﬁt rule using realistic parameter values. Fig-
ures 1.a—d illustrate the results for the case when individual expected lifespans
(starting at age 20, when the individual enters the work force) are uniformly dis-
tributed between 49 and 59 (working) years, and the payroll tax is 20 percent.
The numerical results conﬁrm that the optimal beneﬁt rule is less steep than the
fair schedule (see Figure 1.d).4 The optimal beneﬁt rule can be convex or concave
depending on the parameter values.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Sections
3a n d4d e r i v et h eﬁrst-best and the second-best solutions, respectively. Section 5
outlines the algorithm for numerical solution and Section 6 is devoted to simulation.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In the present version of the paper we analyze the following problem. There is
a (stationary) population of individuals who have private information regarding
their expected lifespan (denoted by t). Every individual enters the labor market
a ta g e0 ,a n dp r o d u c e s1u n i to fg o o d sp e ry e a rw h i l eh eo rs h ei sa c t i v e ,0w h e nh e
or she is inactive (retired or dead). As usual in models of old-age pension systems,
we assume that workers cannot save for retirement.5
The pension systems we consider will be realistic in the following aspects. The
ﬁrst ingredient of a pension scheme is a yearly social security payroll tax, τ < 1,
3Under asymmetric information regarding individual lifespans, every incentive compatible
beneﬁt rule provides such redistribution, and so does the unraveling fair beneﬁtr u l e ,t o o .
4Note that this observation is similar to the one made by Diamond and Mirrlees (1986, p. 27)
in the context of disability insurance: “optimal beneﬁts rise with the age of retirement but more
slowly than would be actuarially fair.”
5The reasons for the lack of adequate retirement savings are that goods are perishable, private
retirement annuities are expensive (due to the asymmetric information problem investigated
here), or agents are short sighted. In the model, we could use either of the ﬁrst two explanations,
so there is a need for a well-designed pension system.
5which is levied on active workers (we assume away other taxes). When a worker
retires (say, at age R), he or she stops producing goods and paying the tax, and
receives a yearly retirement beneﬁt, b>0, until he or she dies. The government
designs the tax rate, τ,a n dt h eb e n e ﬁts c h e d u l ea saf u n c t i o no ft h et i m eo f
retirement, b(R). We require that the pension system be ﬁnancially sound (the
expected beneﬁt payments cannot exceed the amount of social security taxes paid
in). We do not allow the pension system to cut oﬀ or reduce the beneﬁts of
individuals over time, or give out the beneﬁt as a lump-sum transfer at retirement.
Tricks like these would not only make the solution trivial, but more importantly,
contradict the purpose of a social security system.6
An individual’s lifetime utility, v, is the sum of his or her utility when active
and retired. If a worker of type t retires at age R, then he or she receives utility
u(1 − τ) for R years and w(b) for (t − R) years, and the lifetime utility is
v = Ru(1 − τ)+( t − R)w(b). (1)
The individual’s preference for leisure is reﬂected in that u(·) and w(·) are
diﬀerent functions. For simplicity, we may assume that u(x)=w(x) − ε, ε > 0,
where ε is the disutility of labor. The only restriction we make regarding u(·) and
w(·) is that for all τ ∈ (0,1),
w(0) − w
0(0)τ <u (1 − τ) <w (1) − w
0(1)(τ +1 ) . (2)
This (technical) condition ensures that an internal solution to the ﬁrst-best prob-
lem exists (see Theorem 0 in the next section).
The government’s goal is to design an optimal pension system, hb(R),τi,m a x -
imizing an additive concave social welfare function,
P
t ψ(vt)ft,w h e r eft is the
relative frequency of individuals with expected lifespan t.7
We can split the government’s problem into two problems: the optimal choice
of b(R) for a ﬁxed τ, and the optimal choice of τ, given the optimal b(R) schedules
for all τ. In the analysis below (Sections 3 and 4), we will focus on the ﬁrst issue,
the determination of b(R) given τ, because this is the part where asymmetric in-
formation on individual lifespans plays any role. In our model, the social security
tax rate is the same for everyone, thus it is only the beneﬁt—retirement age func-
tion that enables the mechanism designer to sort individuals according to their
expected lifespans.8 Since the social planner cannot observe the individuals’ ex-
6For example, in the latter case, the individual would have to get private life annuities for the
lump-sum transfer at retirement, which would be equally prone to adverse selection due to the
asymmetry of information regarding lifespans.
7In the present version we consider a discrete-type model. Note also that adding up utilities
of individuals with diﬀerent lifespans means that we consider the total utilities of a cohort or the
whole population.
8As opposed to our model, in reality the personal income tax rate depends on the age and
the beneﬁt (cf., Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978), but we neglect this issue.
6pected lifespan, the beneﬁtr u l eh a st ob e( B a y e s i a n )i n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l e .W ew i l l
not impose a participation constraint as the system is mandatory for the agents.
However, we will have a cross-sectional budget balance constraint, as usual in the
optimal income taxation literature.
3 Solution to the First-Best Problem
In this section, we derive the optimal beneﬁt—retirement age schedule (given τ)
under the assumption that every worker’s expected lifespan is commonly observ-
able. The result will serve as a benchmark for the second-best solution, which is
t h es u b j e c to ft h en e x ts e c t i o n .
Due to complete information, the social planner (the mechanism designer) can
design a ﬁrst-best retirement plan by assigning a retirement age, Rt,a n day e a r l y
beneﬁt, bt, to a worker with expected lifespan t,f o ra l lt. Without loss of generality,
we require that Rt ≤ t. We will denote the lifetime utility of a worker with expected
lifespan t by vt,w h e r evt =[ u(1−τ)−w(bt)]Rt+w(bt)t. Types (expected lifespans)
range from S to T (both integers). Since τ is given for now, we denote ¯ u ≡ u(1−τ).
Given τ, the social planner maximizes the frequency-weighted sum of an in-












[(τ + bt)Rt − tbt]ft,
We call this the ﬁrst-best problem. Assign λ to the aggregate budget constraint





ψ([¯ u − w(bt)]Rt + w(bt)t)ft + λ
T X
t=1
{(τ + bt)Rt − tbt}ft.











0(vt)[¯ u − w(bt)] + λ(τ + bt)=0 .
7The solution to the ﬁrst order conditions implies,
Theorem 0. In the ﬁrst-best schedule, (b∗
t,R ∗
t)T
t=1,t h eb e n e ﬁt is invariant with
respect to the expected lifespan, b∗
i ≡ b∗,w h e r eb∗ satisﬁes





This equation has a solution in b∗ by assumption (2). Note that ¯ u<w (b∗),
and the solution to (3) is unique because the derivative of the left hand side is
negative.
Under utilitarianism (i.e., if ψ(v) ≡ v), there may exist several solutions for
R∗
t that satisfy R∗
t ≤ t and the social budget balance constraint with b∗
t ≡ b∗.
One particular utilitarian ﬁrst-best solution is autarky (budget balance holding for





τ + b∗t, t = S,...,T.
If ψ is strictly concave,t h e nR∗
t for t = S,...,Tare determined by the aggregate






0(vs),s , t ∈ {S,...,T},
where vt =[ ¯ u−w(b∗)]Rt+w(b∗)t. Clearly, s<tif and only if R∗
t <R ∗
s. Typically,
the ﬁrst-best scheme diﬀers from autarky.
Note that neither autarky nor the ﬁrst-best solution under strictly concave
ψ is incentive compatible. That is, the social planner cannot implement these
retirement schemes by asking the workers to report their expected lifespans and
assigning them to diﬀerent retirement ages accordingly. This is so because RA
t
(or R∗
t) is strictly increasing in t,w h i l eb∗
t is constant. Hence those workers who
expect to live longer have no incentive to reveal this information as it may only
extend their working years without increasing their beneﬁt. Formally, for R∗
t to be
incentive compatible with b∗
t = b∗, R∗
t h a st ob ec o n s t a n t ,t o o .
What are the restrictions that incentive compatibility imposes on a feasible
mechanism, in general? We turn to the problem of ﬁnding the second-best (optimal
and incentive compatible) retirement mechanism in the next section.
4 Optimal Retirement Mechanism under Asym-
metric Information
Now we return to the model’s original informational assumption and assume that
individuals have private information regarding their expected lifespans, and only
8the distribution of these data is commonly known. Therefore, the optimal beneﬁt—
retirement schedule will have to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints, as usual
in (Bayesian) mechanism design.
Incentive compatibility of (bt,R t)T
t=S means that type t prefers to choose (bt,R t)
from the schedule. The adjacent IC constraints are, for t = S,...,T− 1,
vt ≥ [¯ u − w(bt+1)]Rt+1 + w(bt+1)t = vt+1 − w(bt+1),
vt+1 ≥ [¯ u − w(bt)]Rt + w(bt)(t +1 )=vt + w(bt).
which can be rewritten more compactly as,
vt + w(bt) ≤ vt+1 ≤ vt + w(bt+1),f o r t = S,...,T− 1. (4)
Note that by monotonicity of w(·), bt is weakly increasing. It is easy to show that
non-adjacent IC constraints do not bind, hence we can ignore them.











[(τ + bt)Rt − tbt]ft,
vt + w(bt) ≤ vt+1 ≤ vt + w(bt+1), t = S,...,T− 1.
We will call this the social planner’s “second-best” problem, and analyze its solu-
tion in the rest of the paper. Since the qualitative results are markedly diﬀerent
depending on whether the social welfare function is utilitarian or strictly concave,
we will deal with these two cases in two separate subsections.
4.1 Solution under Utilitarianism
Assume (in this subsection only) that the social welfare function is utilitarian, that







tft <S , (5)
that is, the ﬁrst-best retirement age of a worker with an average expected lifespan
is lower than the lower bound on the distribution of t. (This is a reasonable
assumption for old-age pension.) Then we have the following surprising result.
9Theorem 1. If the social welfare function is utilitarian and (5) holds, then the
socially optimal beneﬁt plan is completely inﬂexible,
b(R)=
½
0 for R<R ∗,
b∗ for R ≥ R∗. (6)
Moreover, the second-best solution attains the ﬁrst-best.
Proof. The beneﬁt rule in (6) corresponds to the mechanism bt ≡ b∗,R t ≡ R∗
for all t. This scheme is incentive compatible because it is constant (the worker’s
allocation does not depend on his announced type). But it is also a ﬁrst-best solu-
tion because the retirement beneﬁt is set accordingly (bt ≡ b∗), and the mechanism
satisﬁes aggregate budget balance,
PT
t=S[(τ + b∗)R∗ − tb∗]ft =0 .N o t ea l s ot h a t
by (5), R∗ ≤ t for all t.
The result of the theorem extends appropriately when (5) does not hold (to be
added in subsequent versions).¥
4.2 Optimal Rule under Strictly Concave ψ
Suppose that ψ(·) is strictly concave. The optimal utilititarian beneﬁtr u l e ,g i v e n
in equation (6), is still feasible and incentive compatible, but it is no longer socially
optimal. Evaluated according to any strictly concave social welfare function, there
is too much redistribution from short-lived individuals to long-lived ones. In other
words, the allocation where all workers have to retire at the same age with the
same beneﬁts appears to be “unfair” to a society that puts larger weights on the
utilities of unlucky individuals (those who were born with lousy genes and will not
live very long).
In order to solve the second-best problem under strictly concave ψ,w eﬁrst
rewrite the second-best problem with Mirrlees’ (1986, Section 6) method of change





and the lifetime net contribution (or balance) of type t by
z(vt,b t,t)=( τ + bt)R(vt,b t,t) − tbt.
Also, let us (temporarily) ignore the “upward” incentive constraints, vt+1 ≤ vt +









z(vt,b t,t)ft ≥ 0,
vt+1 − vt − w(bt) ≥ 0,t = S,...,T− 1.
Assign λ to the ﬁrst constraint and (µt)t to the second group of constraints. Then







µt(vt+1 − vt − w(bt)).
Application of a standard technique yields
Theorem 2. The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for the solution of the second-












v(vt,b t,t)] ft − µt + µt−1 =0 , (8)
L
0






z(vt,b t,t)ft ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0 (w/c.s.), (10)
where µS−1 =0 , µT =0and vT+1 ∈ R.











vt − t¯ u
[w(bt) − ¯ u]2 {(τ + bt)w
0(bt) − [w(bt) − ¯ u]}.
Apart from the improbable corner solution, Theorem 2 implies the following
Corollary. In the optimal solution to the second-best problem, bT = b∗ (ﬁrst-best).
If ψ is strictly concave, then bt <b ∗ for all t<T, that is, all individuals except the
ones with the longest expected lifespan receive lower than ﬁrst-best pension beneﬁts.
Remark. Our formulation uses discrete time, and hence one cannot expect a
smooth beneﬁt function. A continuous time formulation would yield conditions
analogous to equations (7)-(10), and result in a continuous beneﬁt function. We
chose the discrete time formulation because in the numerical simulations we have
to use a discrete approximation anyway.
115 Algorithm for Computing the Second-Best
Since the solution to the system of nonlinear equations in Theorem 2 is quite diﬃ-
cult, and analytical results may be hard (or in some cases, impossible) to obtain, it
is natural to turn to numerical simulations. Numerical computations with realistic
parameter values may also shed light on the quantitative properties of the optimal
beneﬁt rule, and various questions (e.g., regarding the magnitudes of endogenous
variables, their sensitivity to parameter changes, etc.) can be answered.
In this Section we outline an appropriate algorithm to ﬁnd a solution of the
system of nonlinear equations in Theorem 2. In Section 6 we report the results of
simulations using this algorithm.
The problem can be solved recursively as follows. Assume that parameters ¯ u,
τ and (ft)T
t=1 are given.
1. Take an appropriate initial value for λ. This parameter is to be calibrated
to make equation (10) hold in the end.
2 .S t a r tw i t ha ni n i t i a lv a l u ef o rvT (e.g., the static optimum) and set µT =0 .
From equation (7), get bT = b∗.
3. Iteration. For all t,i ft h ev e c t o r(vt+1,b t+1,µ t+1) is given, then obtain
(vt,b t,µ t) as follows. Determine µt from equation (8) at (t +1 ) .T h e nc o m -
pute (bt,v t) from equations (7) and (9).
4. The previous step results in a sequence (vT,b T,µ T),...,(vS,b S,µ S), based
on which µS−1 c a nb ed e t e r m i n e df r o me q u a t i o n( 8 )a tt = S. Adjust vT and
repeat step 3 until µS−1 =0holds.
5. Finally, adjust λ and repeat steps 2-4 until budget balance (equation 10)
holds.
By varying τ and recomputing the optimal schedule, one can determine the
optimal contribution (or tax) rate. Intuitively it is clear that if τ is low, then bt is
also low and Rt is high; on the other hand, if τ is high, then bt is acceptable but
Rt is low, for t = S,...,T.
126S i m u l a t i o n
We turn to the description of our simulations. Assume that from the point of view
of the government, the individuals’ expected lifespans (starting from entering the
w o r k f o r c ea ta g e2 0 )a r eb e t w e e nS =4 9and T =5 9 . Let the pensioner’s felicity
function be of CRRA-type, w(x)=θ−xσ/σ, 1−σ being the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion and denote the disutility of labor by ε.
We shall deﬁne a CRRA family of social welfare functions as follows: ψ(v)=
vρ/ρ, ρ ≤ 1 and call ρ the social welfare inequality index. The lower the index, the
more weight is given to individuals with lower utilities, i.e., the more egalitarian
is the system.
We report several runs of simulation below.
Run 1. First we assume that the lifespans are uniformly distributed: ft ≡ 1.
We set θ =4 .1, σ = −0.5 and ε =1 .398.I nt h eﬁrst-best case, the optimality of
the tax rate implies that the worker’s consumption is equal to pensioner’s. (This
is a consequence of the assumption that the worker’s and the pensioner’s felicity
functions only diﬀer in an additive constant ε.) Therefore let the payroll tax rate
be τ =0 .2.T h e n¯ u =4 .1 − 0.8−0.5 − 1.398 = 0.466,a n dt h eﬁrst-best retirement
beneﬁti sb∗ =0 .8. Note that our choice means that one’s 0.8 unit consumption
as an active worker is equivalent to a 0.303 unit consumption as a pensioner. The
diﬀerence is due to the increased consumption of leisure after retirement. Observe
that the longest-lived person should retire having worked RT = Tb ∗/(τ+b∗)=4 7 .2
years (at the age of 67.2 years).
By Theorem 1, if the social welfare function is utilitarian (a la Harsanyi), then
the optimal incentive compatible pension system will send everybody to retirement
after working 43.2 years with the ﬁrst-best beneﬁt s .T h i sc a n n o tb ei m p r o v e de v e n
under complete information regarding t and diﬀers from autarky only in that long-
lived individuals are subsidized by short-lived individuals.
Run 2. In Runs 2—5 we consider a social welfare function with ρ = −1.W e
display the optimal beneﬁt, retirement age, and net contribution as functions of
individual lifespans in Figures 1.a—c, respectively. We also display the optimal
and the traditional (fair) beneﬁt—retirement age functions in Figures 1.d, central
concepts of the pension incentives.
An additional 10 years in lifespan implies almost 3 years additional service and
about 17% points additional beneﬁt, which is 21% on a relative scale. Note that the
lifetime net contributions vary from 3.1 units for the shortest-lived to —3.5 units for
the longest-lived. Note the retirement age—beneﬁt function is mildly nonlinear. In
order to measure the nonlinearity of the beneﬁt function, we calculate the accrual
rate αt =[ bt+1 − bt]/[Rt+1 − Rt], t = S,...,T− 1.
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15Run 3. Increasing σ to —0.45, in the optimal pension system, the three
shortest-lived types retire at the same (legally prescribed) minimal age Rmin =4 1 .9
and they receive the same minimal beneﬁt bmin =0 .69. (This “bunching” is a stan-
dard feature of optimal mechanism design. See, for example, Mirrlees (1971) where
workers of the lowest ability are excluded from work and given a minimum bene-
ﬁt.) For the remaining eight types, the incentive constraints apply to: the longer
somebody lives, the later s/he retires. Decreasing σ to —0.55, one obtains approx-
imately linear retirement age—beneﬁt function. Further decreasing σ to —0.6, one
obtains a convex retirement age—beneﬁt function.
Run 4. To simplify the calculations, we compress our 11 types into 3 types,
with lifespans 51, 54 and 57 years, but retain a uniform distribution on these three
points. Table 1 illustrates the characteristics of Run 4.
Table 1. Optimal characteristics for the compressed model
Lifespan Beneﬁt Retirement age Balance Slope of beneﬁt
tb t Rt zt αt
51 0.666 41.437 1.916 0.060
54 0.733 42.539 0.109 0.065
57 0.800 43.573 -2.024 —
Note that the compressed model only approximates the original model, for
example, the concave beneﬁt function turns into a convex one.
Run 5. Until now we have ﬁxed the payroll tax rate. However, the optimal
choice of this rate is a central issue of pension economics. Let us try to determine
the socially optimal τ in our compressed model. Figure 2c shows that the social
welfare function is rather ﬂat at the autark optimum (20%). We display the optimal
beneﬁt and retirement age for the minimal, medium, and maximal ages as functions
of the contribution rate in Figures 2.a—b, respectively. The beneﬁts slightly increase
or stagnate and the retirement ages sharply diminish, as the tax rate rises.
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7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have applied standard techniques of mechanism design to de-
termine optimal pension beneﬁt rules, in the case where individuals have private
information regarding their own expected lifespan. We have characterized the opti-
mal contribution and beneﬁt functions by a set of necessary ﬁrst-order conditions.
We developed a practical algorithm to compute the optimal incentives and ﬁlled
the program with realistic data. Our simulations, however, glossed over many im-
portant details, including the heterogeneity of labor disutilities and the interaction
of the pension system with income taxation. Moreover, we have only provided nu-
merical (and not yet analytical) conﬁrmation for some important conjectures, in
particular, that the lifetime net contribution and the ratio of beneﬁtt ot h el e n g t h
of employment are increasing functions of the individual lifespan. Further research
will have to clarify our exploratory results.
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